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the ease before ns, it s;eems clear that petitioner ... was 
not immune from service of summons." (P. 241.) 
These policy considerations are controlling in the present 
case. Mrs. V elkov was the moving party in the disciplinary 
proceeding, which concerns the same transaction which is the 
basis of the action for declaratory relief. Under such cir-
cumstances, no public interest would be served by granting 
the claimed immunity. 
The writ of prohibition is denied, and the alternative writ 
is discharged. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Carter, J., 'rraynor, J., Schauer, J., 
and Spence, J., concurred. 
[Sac. No. 6309. In Bank. Feb. 20, 1953.] 
THOMAS S. WHALEN, Appellant, v. AL RUIZ et al., De-
fendants; SOUTHERN PACIFIC COMPANY (a Cor-
poration) et al., Respondents. 
[1] Easements-Mode and Extent of User-Maintenance of Ease-
ment.-Where railroad built a bridge across a river and 
granted to counties which the bridge connected an easement 
for use of the overhead or roadway portion of the bridge for 
highway purposes, the railroad, as owner of the servient 
tenement, is not obligated by the mere grant of the easement 
to maintain the easement in a safe condition for the protec-
tion of those using it at the invitation of the easement owners. 
[2] !d.-Mode and Extent of User-Changes.-Where railroad 
built a bridge across a river and granted to counties which 
the bridge connected an easement for use of the overhead or 
roadway portion of the bridge for highway purposes, the 
constructed curb and railing on the highway deck of the 
bridge formed a part of the subject matter of the easement, 
and it is not incumbent on the railroad to alter these struc-
tural features of the roadway or substitute others therefor 
to accommodate the changing needs of public travel accord-
ing to future development, in the absence of an agreement 
[1] Right of owner of easement of way to make improvements 
or repairs thereon, note, 112 A.L.R. 1303. See, also, Cal.Jur., 
Easements, § 8; Am.Jur., Easements, § 108. 
McK. Dig. References: [11 Easements, § 37; [2, 8, 9] Ease-
mentA, § 29; [3, 4, 6, 7, 10] Railroads, §58; [5] Contraets, ~ 150. 
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devolving such duty on the railroad as owner of the servient 
tenement. 
[3] Railroads-Bridges-Repairs.-Where railroad built a bridge 
across a river and entered into an agreement with counties, 
which the bridge connected, to "keep in repair" the overhead 
or roadway portion of the bridge, the quoted words do not 
require the railroad to make structural changes thereon, since 
the word "repair" in its ordinary sense relates to the preser-
vation of property in its original condition, and does not 
carry the connotation that a new thing should be made or 
a distinct entity created. 
[4a, 4b] Id.-Bridges--Repairs.-vVhere a railroad and the eonn-
ties with which the railroad agreed to "keep in repair" the 
overhead or roadway portion of a bridge interpreted their 
agreement as not imposing on the railroad the duty to make 
structural changes in the highway deck of the bridge, such con-
struction will be adopt<"d by the courts since it is not only rea-
sonable, but a eontrary construetion would not reflect the ordi-
nary meaning of the language used. ( Civ. Code, ~ 1644.) 
[5] Contracts-Interpretation-Construction by Parties.-A con-
struction given a contract by the acts and conduct of the 
parties with knowledge of its terms, before any controversy 
has arisen as to its meaning, is entitled to great weight and 
will, when reasonable, be adopted and enforced by the court. 
[6] Railroads-Bridges-"Operate and Police."-Where railroad 
built a drawbridge across a river and entered into an agreement 
with counties, which the bridge connected, to "operate and 
police" the overhead or roadway portion of the bridge, the 
quoted words do not require the railroad to make structural 
changes on the overhead structure, since the word "operate," 
when used in connection with a drawbridge or machinery that 
moves, means to "put in action and supervise the working 
of," to "run." 
[7) Id.-Bridges-"Operate and Police."-Where division engineer 
of railroad which entered into an agreement with certain 
counties to "operate and police" the overhead or roadway 
portion of a drawbridge across a river testified that oYer tl;e 
years of the agreement the railroad's operation of the bridge 
had been confined exclusively to operation of the draw span, 
such procedure indicates the parties' practical construction 
of their agreement in reference to the railroad's operation of 
the mechanism whidt eontrolled the nwyabh: part of the 
bridge, aud, iu eouueetion with other testinwuy rPlatiug to 
the railroad's clm,;ing of the gates when the bridge was about 
to open and stopping the tmffic before the gate~ were closed, 
[ 5] See Cal.Jur., Contracts, § 184; Am.Jur., Contraets, § 249. 
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is entitled to great weight in solving the meaning of the 
quoted words. 
[8] Easements-Mode and Extent of User-Changes.-Since the 
extent o~ervitude is determined by the terms of the grant 
or the nature of the enjoyment by which it was acquired 
( Civ. Code, § 806), both parties have a right to insist that 
so long as the easement is enjoyed it shall remain substan-
tially the same as it was at the time the right accrued, re-
gardless of the question as to the relative benefit and damage 
that would ensue to the parties by reason of a change in 
the mode of its enjoyment. 
[9] !d.-Mode and Extent of User-Changes.-Where railroad 
built a bridge across a river and granted to counties which 
the bridge connected an easement for use of the overhead 
or roadway portion of the bridge for highway purposes, and 
the state, some 14 years thereafter, entered into an agreement 
with the railroad and counties whereby the state undertook 
to make all necessary changes in the overhead structure, such 
agreement demonstrates that the state had knowledge of 
the prior agreement between the railroad and the counties 
as to the nature of ~sement granted and secured their 
consent before undertaking to alter the manner of its use 
and enjoyment. (Civ. Code, § 806.) 
[10] Railroads-Bridges-Maintenance and Repairs.-In view of 
statutory provisions that the State Department of Public 
Works shall have full possession and control of all state 
highways and is directed to improve and maintain such high-
ways and to do any act necessary or proper for the im-
provement, maintenance or control of all highways under 
its control (Sts. & Hy. Code, § 100), and that the degree 
and type of maintenance for each highway shall be deter-
mined by the state agency ( Sts. & Hy. Code, § 27), the state, 
and not the railroad which built a bridge across a river with 
the overhead or roadway portion to be used by the adjoining 
counties for highway purposes, would have authority to make 
structural changes in the highway deck of the bridge and 
would be chargeable with the undertaking of appropriate 
safety measures pursuant to its maintenance of the state 
highway system. 
APPEAl_; from portion of a judgment of the Superior 
Court of Sacramento County. B. F. Van Dyke, Judge. Af-
firmed. 
Aetion for damages for personal injuries sustained by pas-
senger of autobus when it ran off a bridge maintained by de-
fendant railroad company. Part of judgment that plaintiff 
take nothing against defendant railroad, affirmed. 
Feb.1953] WHALEN v. Rmz 
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Mull & Pierce, A. M. Mull, ,Jr., Fred Pierce and Benjamin 
II. Brown for Appellant. 
Devlin, Diepenbrock & Wulff and Horace B. Wulff for Re-
spondents. 
SPENCE, ,J.-This case presents the question of the lia-
bility, if any, of a railroad company for failure to make 
struetural changes to meet changing traffic conditions on the 
highway deck of a bridge, which bridge is owned and operated 
and which highway deck was used as a public highway under 
the terms of an agreement with the public authorities. 
Plaintiff sought damages for injuries sustained by him 
when an autobus, in which he and other farm laborers were 
riding, ran off the highway deck of the ''I'' Street bridge 
over the Sacramento River at Sacramento and crashed to the 
ground below. Plaintiff alleged negligence against defendant 
railroad in the maintenance of the bridge and against de-
fendant Al Ruiz in operation of the bus. Defendant Frank 
King was sued as owner of the bus and as employer of the 
driver Ruiz. The trial court found that the accident occurred 
as the "proximate and contributing result" of negligent opera-
tion of the bus by the driver, as employee of defendant King, 
and negligent maintenance of the overhead structure of the 
bridge ; that defendant railroad was the owner and operator of 
the bridge; that construction of the overhead or roadway por-
tion of the bridge was controlled by an agreement dated 
September 6, 1910, executed by the railroad and the counties 
of Sacramento and Yolo, whereby the railroad granted to the 
counties the ''right, easement and privilege of using the over-
head structure and approaches thereto for highway purposes 
and for the life of the bridge for railroad purposes'' ; that 
the agreement also provided that the railroad would "repair, 
police and operate" the overhead structure and approaches 
thereto but that it ''did not include any obligation'' on the 
part of the "Railroad Company, or any other defendant 
herein, to do more than to maintain said structure according 
to the design and plan under which said bridge was originally 
built and that there was no obligation . . . to make structural 
changes to meet changing traffic conditions." It was also 
found that the overhead structure and approaches thereto 
were part of the state highway system; that plaintiff was the 
employee of defendant King and engaged in the course of 
his employment when injured; and that both were subject 
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to the Workmen's Compensation Act. From such findings the 
court concluded that plaintiff's sole remedy against defendant 
King was within the jurisdiction of the Industrial Accident 
Commission, and that the court had no jurisdiction; and fur-
ther, that plaintiff should take nothing by his complaint. Ac-
cordingly, judgment was entered in favor of all defendants. 
Plaintiff appeals from that portion of the judgment which 
decrees that he take nothing against the railroad. 
The original construction of the bridge and overhead struc-
ture, as completed in 1912, is conceded to have been proper. 
However, appellant claims that with the increased use of 
motor vehicle travel, respondent was negligent in failing to 
maintain an adequate guardrail and curbing along the edge 
of the pavement on the overhead highway deck of the bridge. 
At the time of the accident, September 6, 1947, the roadway 
was equipped with an 8-inch curb and an iron railing, as 
provided in the original specifications. But this is not a case 
where the common-law principle of tort liability applies 
against respondent incident to a duty to maintain the high-
way deck of the bridge in a reasonably safe condition for use 
by the traveling public at its express or implied invitation. 
(Comstock v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 157 Minn. 345 [196 
N.W. 177] ; Calley v. Boston & ll!aine R. R., 93 N.H. 359 [ 42 
A.2d 329, 159 A.L.R. 115] .) Rather the controlling factor 
is the mentioned agreement of 1910 fixing the rights and 
obligations of the parties thereto with regard to the bridge and 
overhead structure ·vve have concluded that the trial court 
properly construed the terms of said agreement as not im-
posing on respondent the obligation to make structural changes 
on the highway deck of the bridge to conform to changing 
traffic needs and modes of travel. 
The 1910 agreement provided for respondent's construction 
of a double track bridge, with an overhead structure for 
highway purposes, connecting the counties of Yolo and Sac-
ramento and extending over the Sacramento River. It re-
cited that the new structure was to replace an existing bridge 
and overhead span which had been used in part for high-
way purposes and which were then out of repair. The cost 
of the new bridge was specified as $786,000, of which the 
estimate for the overhead deck and approaches thereto was 
$160,671. By the agreement respondent leased the overhead 
deck to Sacramento County for a period from the completion 
of the bridge until December 15, 1916, after which time said 
county was to (and did) receive a grant of the "right, ease-
Feb. 1953] ·wHALEN v. Rurz 
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ment and privilege of using the overhead structure and ap-
proaches thereto'' for the life of the bridge. For the portion 
of the bridge located in Yolo County, respondent granted 
an identical easement to that county, also continuing for the 
life of the bridge. The enjoyment of such easement and 
privilege of use was not to "be interfered with" by re-
spondent unless the county was in default in some term of 
the agreement. The agreement further provided that until 
December 15, 1916 (the termination of the lease to Sacramento 
County), respondent would "keep in repair, operate and 
police at its own expense, the said bridge, including the floor 
of the overhead structure and the walks and railings thereon" 
but after said date, during the life of the bridge, it would 
''keep in repair and operate all of said bridge, except the over-
head structure and approaches thereto." To this point of 
exception, the agreement continued: ''Whereas, it is recog-
nized that after December 15th, 1916, the keeping in repair, 
operation and policing of the overhead structure, and ap-
proaches thereto, is properly chargeable to the said Counties 
of Sacramento and Yolo, and said Counties desire that the 
said 'Company' should agree to keep in repair and operate 
and police the same, as it is more convenient for the 'Com-
pany' to do so, Now, Therefore, the said 'Company' agrees 
to keep in repair, operate and police the said overhead struc-
ture, and approaches thereto, after December 15th, 1916, and 
during the life of said bridge for railroad purposes, and in 
consideration thereof" Sacramento County was to pay $1,500 
per year and Yolo County, $500 per year; and, "if for any 
reason, any payment ... shall not be made ... said Com-
pany ... shall not be further obligated to keep in repair, 
or operate, or police said overhead structure, and the ap-
proaches thereto.'' 
It is plain from the agreement that the respective coun-
t iPs werr grantrcl an exr lnsive right of way or easement 
over the highway fleck of the briilge. Admittedly the highway 
deck and approaches tl1ereto were built according to the 
agreed plans and specifications, and they were then in a 
safe and proper condition for use of the existing traffic. 
[1] Respondent, as owner of the c:ervient tenement, did not 
become obligated by the mere grant of the easement to main-
tain the easement in a safe condition for the protection of 
those using it at the invitation of the easement owners, the 
two counties. (9 Cal.Jur., § 8, p. 954; Linton v. Miller & 
Lux, lnc., 83 CaLApp. 481, 484 [257 P. 105) ; see, also, Rest., 
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Torts, § 349.) [2] The constructed curb and railing on 
the highway deck of the bridge formed a part of the subject 
matter of the easement, and it was not incumbent upon re-
spondent to alter these structural features of the roadway 
or substitute others therefor to accommodate the changing 
needs of public travel according to future development, in 
the absence of an agreement devolving such duty upon re-
spondent as owner of the servient tenement. (28 C.J.S. 
"Easements," § 72, p. 750; § 94, p. 773; Carson v. Jackson 
Land&; Min. Co., 90 W.Va. 781 [111 S.E. 846, 847].) 
By the agreement of 1910 respondent had the obligation 
to "keep in repair, operate and police" the overhead struc-
ture of the bridge. The agreement recognized that after 
the effective date of the easement to Sacramento County 
(December 15, 1916, upon termination of its lease arrange-
ment with respondent), such obligation was properly charge-
able to the counties as owners of the easement (Crease v. 
Jarrell, 65 Cal.App. 554, 559 [224 P. 762] ), but as a matter 
of convenience, respondent was made responsible for the 
performance of this work in return for an annual payment 
by the counties. This contractual undertaking must be ex-
amined as fixed by the contracting parties. 
[3] It does not appear that respondent's obligation to 
"keep in repair, operate and police" the highway deck of 
the bridge contemplated the making of structural changes 
thereon. The word "repair" in its ordinary sense relates 
to the preservation of property in its original condition, and 
does not carry the connotation that a new thing should be 
made or a distinct entity created. (76 C.J.S. p. 1169.) As was 
said in Realty &; Rebuilding Co. v. Rea, 184 Cal. 565, at page 
ri76 [194 P. 1024]: "To repair means to mend an old thing, 
not to make a new thing; to restore to a sound state some-
thing' which has become partially dilapidated, not to create 
something which has no existence." (See, also, Santa Cruz 
Rock Paveme11t Co. v. Broderick, 113 Cal. 628, 633 r 45 P. 
8631.) Appellant cites Bosqui v. City of San Bernardino, 
2 Ca1.2d 747 [43 P.2d 547], where the railroad's duty to 
''keep in repair'' was likened to the ''duty to maintain.'' 
But under the facts there involved, no broader definition was 
thereby contemplate([. There the duty "related to the struc-
t nn• itself," a viaduct, including the "duty to repair or re-
plae.e weakened or worn portions" thereof, and the railroad 
>vas held liable when the viaduct was allowed to "fail or de-
cline'' and injury was sustained as the result of certain 
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splinters projecting from itR worn and dilapidated wooden 
(mrbings. (P. 75R.) There the failure to repair was a failure 
to keep the cnrbingf' in their. original condition. Consistent 
with such definition of the word ''repair,'' respondent had the 
duty to keep the overhead structure at the ''standard of 
efficiency'' it had according to the design and plan under 
which it waR originally constructed, but not to make struc-
tmal changes to meet developing exigencies of traffic over the 
years. (See In re Morris Ave. Bridge, 105 Misc. 659 [174 
N.Y.S. 682, 683).) 
[4a] Moreover, the parties did not interpret their agree-
ment as imposing upon respondent the duty to make structural 
changes in the highway deck of the bridge. Respondent's 
division engineer testified that, in his 30 years' experience 
with respondent, he knew it to ''have at various times made 
repairs to the overhead structure ... when the railing be-
comes broken . . . [and J restore it to its original condition" 
but the "railroad .... made no structural changes." The 
counties acquiesced in this interpretation of the agreement 
and never made "any demand" upon respondent "to alter the 
nature of the construction or the construction features of the 
bridge.'' He further testified that such ''structural changes 
or alterations" as were made were done by the state, twice 
with respondent's consent and once without. [5] The "con-
struction given the contract by the acts and conduct of the 
parties with knowledge of its terms, before any controversy 
has arisen as to its meaning, is entitled to great weight and 
will, when reasonable, be adopted and enforced by the courts." 
(Woodbine v. Van Horn, 29 Cal.2d 95, 104 [173 P.2d 17]; 
Gillespie v. City of Los Angeles, 36 Cal.2d 553, 561 [225 P.2d 
522] ; Trottier v. M. H. Golden Const1·uction Co., 105 Cal.App. 
2d 511, 516 [233 P.2d 675].) [4b] Here the construction 
placed by the parties upon their agreement is not only reason-
able, but a contrary construction would not ref:lect the ordinary 
meaning of the language used. ( Civ. Code, § 1644~) 
[6] Nor do the words "operate and police" place upon 
respondent the duty to make structural changes on the over-
head structure. Built across the Sacramento River, the bridge 
is a drawbridge constructed so as to allow the passage of river 
navigation. Normally the word "operate" when used in 
connection with machinery or something that moves, as here 
the drawbridge, means to ''put in action and supervise the 
working of," to "run." (67 C.J.S. p. 502; see Gallenkamp v. 
Garvin Mach. Co., 91 App.Div. 141 [86 N.Y.S. 378, 384], 
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179 N.Y. 588 [72 N.E. 1142J .) Respondent's division 
engineer testified that over the years of the agreement, re-
spondent's operation of the bridge had been confined exclu-
sively to ''operation of the draw span.'' Such procedure in-
dicates the parties' practical construction of their agreement 
in reference to respondent's operation of the mechanism vvhich 
eontrolled the movable part of the bridge. As to the purport 
of respondent's ''policing obligation,'' the same witness testi-
fied that it related to respondent's closing of the gates when 
the bridge was about to open and stopping traffic before he 
gates were closed; also sweeping and removing rubbish from 
the upper deck. The construction the parties placed on their 
agreement extending over some 3G years is entitled to great 
weight in the solution of any difficulty as to the meaning of 
the language used. (JJiitau v. Roddan, 149 Cal. 1, 14 [84 P. 
145, 6 L.R.A.N.S. 275] ; Therrnalito hr. Dist. v. California 
WaterS. Co., 108 Cal.App.2d 329, 341 [239 P.2d 109] .) 
It is fair to assume that had the parties intended to im-
pose the sweeping obligation on respondent to make such 
structural changes in the highway deck of the bridge as would 
keep it reasonably safe for ever changing traffic conditions, 
some mention thereof would have been made in their agree-
ment. But no such provision appears and respondent, in its 
unconditional grant of the easement to the counties for use 
of the highway deck, reserved no right to interfere there-
with for the purpose of making alterations or structural im-
provements. Under the circumstances the parties presumably 
intended the California law declaring the rights and obliga-
tions tlowing from the grant of an easement to be applicable. 
[8] Section 806 of the Civil Code provides that the extent 
of a servitude is determined by the terms of the grant, or the 
nature of the enjoyment by whieh it was acquired; and it is 
well settled that ''both parties have the right to insist that so 
long as the easement is enjoyed it shall remain substantially 
the same as it was at the time the right accrued, entirely re-
gardless of the question as to the relative benefit and damage 
that would ensue to the parties by reason of a change in the 
mode and manner of its enjoyment.'' (Allen v. San Jose Land 
d7 Water Co., 92 Cal. 138, 141 [28 P. 215, 1G L.R.A. 93]; see 
Hannah v. Pogue, 23 Cal.2d 849, 854 [147 P.2d 572] .) 
[9] The record shows that such structural changes as 
were made on the overhead structure from time to time were 
done by the state and at its expense. The first of such changes 
was in pursuance of an agreement of March 23, 1934, to which 
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the state, the counties and respondent were parties. Thereby 
the state undertook to make all necessary changes in the over-
!J ead strncture-' 'said work consisting of widening of the 
pavement for vehicular traffic, reconstruction of sidewalks, 
shifting of railings and lighting standards, and shifting curbs 
in locations shovvn" on the specifications-as would facilitate 
its use as a (1etoue during the construction of the new "M:" 
Street bridge. It was also agreed thereby that the state would 
''maintain the roadway of [the J overhead structure and ap-
pt·oaehrs at its expense, and in the event conditions due to in-
erea;.;e<l traffie reqnire additional policing to properly maintain 
and safegnard traffic during the period of detour State shall 
assume the entire cost thereof.'' 
'!'his 19:34 agreement demonstrates that the state had knowl-
edge of the ] 910 agreement between respondent and the 
connties as to the natnre of the E'asement granted and secured 
their consent before undertaking to alter the manner of its use 
and enjoyment. ( Civ. Code, § 806.) Moreover, two subse-
quent structural changes were made on the overhead structure 
b~- the state and at its Pxpense. Having knowledge of the 1910 
agrePmPnt, the state would not have voluntarily undertaken 
to make such structural improvements if any such duty were 
imposed on the parties to the said agreement. Rather the 
state's action coincided with its statutory duty in reference 
to the roadway running across the overhead structure as con-
stitnting a traversable state highway. (Stats. 1933, ch. 767, 
§ 7.) 
[10] Section 100 of the Streets and Highways Code, 
enactecl in 19:35 and in effect at the time of the accident in 
question, provided: ''The [state] department [of public 
'vorh:s l shall haYe fu.ll possession and control of all State 
highwa;'s. The department is authorized and directed ... to 
irn.prove and maintain snch highways as provided in this code . 
. . . T1w departmrnt may f1o any act necessar11 or proper for 
the constnwtion, hnpro'l'cment. maintenance or control of all 
highways and properties which are under its control. ... '' 
(Emphasis added.) Section 27 of the same code defines main-
tenance to include "(h) The necessary provision for special 
safety conveniences and devices'' and further provides: "The 
degree ancl type of mm.ntenance for each highway ... shall 
be determined" by the state agency. Under these provisions 
the state, not responitent, would have authority to make 
structural changes in the highway deck of the bridge and 
would be chargeable with the undertaking of appropriate 
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safety measures pursuant to its maintenance of the state high-
way system. (Gillespie v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 36 CaL 
2d 553, 557-558.) 
In view of these observations, the trial court's exonera-
tion of respondent from liability is fully sustained by the 
record. Neither by express provision nor as practically con-
strued by the parties did the controlling 1910 agreement im-
pose upon respondent an obligation to make structural changes 
on the highway deck of the bridge to conform with changing 
traffic needs, but rather all changes of that character pro-
ceeded at the instance and cost of the state pursuant to its 
statutory duty. Having neither obligation nor authority to 
make structural changes in the highway deck of its bridge, 
r0spondent is not chargeable with responsibility for the hap-
pening of the accident here involved. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Traynor, ,J., allll 
Sehauer, J., concurred. 
CARTER, J.-The majority opm10n holds that since an 
easement was granted by the railroad company to the coun-
ties to use the bridge for road purposes, the company was 
under no obligation to keep the bridge in a safe condition. 
The whole tenor of the 1910 agreement and other factors 
points to at least joint control of the roadway part of the 
bridge by the railroad company and the counties. 
The 1910 agreement stated that it was made under statu-
tory authority. (Stats. 1907, p. 982.) That statute author-
izes agreements between counties and private persons for the 
acquisition and maintenance of bridges. Such an agreement 
shall provide for the "joint use" of a bridge by the parties 
and it shall be referred to as a ''joint'' bridge. With that 
statutory base the obvious purpose of the 1910 contract was 
that the bridge was to be "jointly" used and hence "jointly" 
owned and controlled by the railroad company and the coun-
ties. 
The 1910 contract, after referring to the easement to be 
granted to the counties, provides that the railroad company 
(after 1916) shall, for a stated sum, "keep in repair and 
, operate and police'' the road portion of the bridge. Why 
was that undertaken by the company~ This question is an-
swered by the contract as it states, immediately preceding 
the covenant to repair and operate, as follows: "Whereas, it 
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is recognized" (emphasis added) that after 1916, the up-
keep is chargeable to the counties but the counties desire that 
the railroad company should agree "to keep in repair and 
operate the same, as it is more convenient for the [company 1 
to do so." (Emphasis added.) This clearly shows that the 
railroad company should continue as before-have control of 
the bridge including the roadway and be in charge of its 
maintenance; that although the counties may, in a technical 
sense, have an easement for a roadway over the bridge, the 
railroad company still had joint control and obligated itself 
to do anything the counties would be required to do with 
reference to keeping the bridge safe. 
This thought was further indicated by the 1934 contract 
between the counties, state, and the railroad company, in 
which the state was authorized to make some improvements 
in the road part of the bridge. If the railroad company no 
longer had any control or interest in the road part of the 
bridge by reason of the easement granted to the counties, there 
would have been no occasion for it to be a party to that con-
tract and consent to the improvements. It is recited in that 
contract that the railroad company and the counties are 
willing to permit the state to make the improvements on 
specified conditions however. The conditions are, among 
others, that the work must be performed to the satisfaction 
of the railroad company ; that during the time the bridge is 
being used by the state for detour purposes the state shall 
maintain the road portion at its expense, and if traffic con-
ditions require additional policing during that time the 
state shall furnish same, all of which indicates that the state 
was assuming that which was the duty of the railroad com-
pany; and :finally that all the terms of the 1910 contract 
shall remain in force, that is, shall become revitalized from 
thenceforth, although the traffic conditions and requirements 
to keep the bridge safe had vastly increased in 1934 from 
those existing when the 1910 contract was made. 
The only reasonable conclusion from these factors is that 
the words "repair," "operate" and "police" were not used 
in a narrow sense; that the railroad company retained at least 
joint control of the road part of the bridge and was obli-
gated to maintain it in a safe condition. 
Reliance is placed by the majority on the testimony of the 
railroad company's division engineer that the company had 
made no structural changes in the road part of the bridge 
for 30 years and the counties never made demand for any. 
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The complete answer to this argument is that it does not 
appear that the counties were apprised that any changes were 
necessary. 
The words ''operate'' and ''repair'' must be defined ac-
cording to the context in which they were used. The thing 
to be maintained was a roadway. The counties would be con-
cerned with only one thing, namely, that the bridge be kept 
safe for those who used it, the travelling public. "Operate" 
means to have control of (State v. Thomason, 224 Iowa 499 
[276 N.W. 619]; Booth v. State, 179 Ind. 405 [100 N.E. 563, 
Ann.Cas. 1915D 987, L.R.A. 1915B 420]; Southern Ry. Co. 
v. Flynt, 203 Ala. 65 [82 So. 25] ; Bosse v. Marye, 80 Cal. 
App. 109 [250 P. 693]) and includes doing so safely. (McKim 
v. City of Philadelphia, 217 Pa. 243 [66 A. 340].) "Tore-
pair the roads in question means to make them over, not 
necessarily exactly like they were before, nor in exact ac-
cord with the original plans, but, utilizing the work done in 
constructing the roads originally under the original plans, 
make them over with such material for resurfacing as ex-
perience and advance in the science of road building teach 
will be the best and the most economical in the long run, 
thereby giving the landowners value received for their in-
vestment.'' (Cowan v. Thompson, 178 Ark. 44 [9 S.W.2d 
790, 792].) (Emphasis added.) The obligation to repair 
was to run indefinitely in the future, thus contemplating that 
future conditions must be considered in determining what 
would be necessary to do to keep the road portion in repair. 
Those conditions thus include changes in traffic conditions 
and also methods of operation which may produce the neces-
sity for extensive repairs. The obligation to make such re-
pairs was placed on the railroad company by the 1910 agree-
ment and continued in force until the happening of the ac-
cident here involved. Since the court found that the unsafe 
condition of the roadway on the bridge was a proximate cause 
of the accident, the liability of the railroad company was 
established. 
I would therefore reverse the judgment. 
